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Introduction 
 
Immigration is a very important issue in many countries, both developed and developing. Legislation 
to grant amnesty to migrants was submitted and failed before the US Congress. Fences have also been 
erected in the USA to stop the flow of migrants from Mexico. Even a country like India with an 
enormously large population and high unemployment receives a large number of illegal migrants from 
neighbouring countries. Given the importance of migration in many countries, it is important to ask: 
what are the effects of foreign migration on the economy of the host country, and in particular the 
effects on the welfare of the domestic residents. Several economists dealing with this question have 
focused on the income distribution effects of migration. For instance, do wages decrease, or do the 
cost and the sustainability of the income transfer policy of the government worsen? One reason for 
discussing this aspect of the migration issue is that the anti-immigration feelings are especially strong 
in specific social groups1. Find more recent illustrative facts. 
 
The motivation of this paper comes from the following stylised facts. First, some countries have a 
moderate ratio of migrants in the population. OECD countries are a typical example of this moderate 
percentage, about 13% of the US population is foreign born. Second, other countries have a very large 
body of migrants. The International Migration Outlook  of the OECD (2006) notes that most foreign 
migrants in OECD countries are allowed to settle in OECD countries for non-economic reasons: 
asylum seekers, family reunification, the regularisation of illegal migrants and so on. People who 
migrate for economic reasons, in general are hired in specific jobs, often but not always with low or no 
skills, which domestic workers do not want to take because of their unattractive working conditions 
                                                 
1 Benhabib(1996) examines how immigration policies would be determined under majority voting when native 
agents differ in their wealth holding and vote to maximise their income. Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) 
complement this approach and investigate the link between migration and tax transfer policy when domestic 
residents differ in ability and hold different skills. These papers are based on one-sector models. Other papers 
use a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, for instance Wellisch and Walz (1998). Scheve and Slaughter (1999) analyse 
opinion surveys and show that people with less skill (who directly compete with foreign migrants) are more 
hostile to immigration. Facchini and Mayda (2006) confirm this result, and complete it by showing that people 
with high income (who pay the taxes, which finance the welfare transfers to migrants) are also more hostile to 
immigration. 
and payments. The number of migrants who are given these working permits is low, especially in 
Western Europe. However, a few countries admit a much higher number of migrants. In its report for 
2005, the International Organisation for Migration writes: “It is estimated that by 2000 international 
migrants constituted 38 per cent of the population in Bahrain, 49 per cent in Kuwait, 26 per cent in 
Oman, 70 per cent in Qatar, 24 per cent in Saudi Arabia and 68 per cent in the United Arab Emirates.” 
Other evaluations given in the report are higher, and the share of migrants in labour force is still 
higher: it is equal to 55.8 per cent in Saudi Arabia and represents 70 per cent in all Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. 
 
The model we suggest has its roots in the literature on migration theory starting with Berry and Soligo 
(1969). They proved the important result that the income of domestic residents is an increasing and 
unbounded function of the number of migrants. However, the marginal effect of immigration on this 
income is zero when in the initial equilibrium the number of migrants is zero. Borjas (1999) confirmed 
that this result rema ins approximately valid when the number of migrants is of the order of magnitude 
observed in OECD countries. He concludes that the presence of migrants, who represented about 10 
per cent of the labour force of the U.S. economy, increased at most by 0.4 per cent the income of 
American citizens 2. This result is the second reason for the lack of interest of economists for the effect 
of immigration on the income of the natives. 
 
This paper will suggest an explanation of the stylised facts and provides reasons as to why, in spite of 
the theoretical result that the income of domestic residents is an increasing and unbounded function of 
the number of migrants, migrants are unwelcome in OECD countries, the exception being those who 
are segregated in unattractive and poorly paid jobs. It will also explain why in other wealthy countries 
the number of legal migrants is very high. The analysis and the explanation given in this paper 
eliminate all considerations related to income distribution: domestic residents are identical and there is 
no place for income redistribution policy. We will also assume that there is no difference in skills 
                                                 
2 However, the distribution effect can be very high; the income of capital may increase by until 12 per cent and 
the income of domestic workers may decrease by 6 per cent. 
between domestic and foreign workers. Thus, our paper differs from most previous approaches. We 
will use a simple neo-classical model and compute the optimal number of migrants. Our domestic 
residents are selfish and bear no altruistic feeling for migrant workers. They also are not prejudiced 
against them. Thus, our analysis excludes motivations based on a taste for discrimination or racism3. 
 
The optimal number of migrants in the model is not infinite because domestic residents consume a 
public service, which is a complement of a private good in consumption.  Migrants cannot be excluded 
from the use of the public service. Then, for a given level of this service, the benefits obtained by its 
users decrease with the number of migrants because its quality decreases due to congestion. The 
supply of the public service can be increased at a cost. However, as the output of the public service 
also depends on fixed inputs such as land and space, its marginal cost is increasing. In this scenario 
although migrants make a positive contribution to national income, they will reduce the welfare of the 
domestic residents when too many of these migrants are present in the economy.  
 
Public service has a very wide meaning in this paper. It includes health and education. As the costs of 
providing them are approximately constant, migrants do not create congestion if they pay a fair 
amount of taxes. However, the supply of other services can be raised only at increasing cost, because 
their input includes land, air, water and other natural resources with inelastic supply. OECD countries, 
with no lack of space such as Australia and Canada, are also those with the highest proportion of 
foreign born in total population. In this paper, the only externalities created by migrants work through 
the congestion effect. We will not consider other externalities, positive or negative, such as the taste 
for for cultural diversity, or the desire to keep the society homogenous, of domestic residents4. 
 
We begin by assuming that the domestic residents and migrants are perfect substitutes. When the 
number of migrants in the country is zero, we know that a small inflow of migrants has no effect on 
                                                 
3 There exists an empirical literature, using opinion surveys, which tries to disentangle economic reasons from 
racist and xenophobic sentiments in the reluctance of public opinion against a softening of immigration controls. 
See for instance Dustman and Preston (2004) and Malchow-Moller and alii (2006). 
4 The approach used in this paper is connected to but different from the important literature evaluating the impact 
of immigration on the costs of the welfare systems. Nannestad (2007) gives an excellent review of this literature. 
the income of domestic residents. However, the quality of the public service declines, and the welfare 
of domestic residents decreases. As the number of immigrants approaches infinity, the quality of the 
public service converges to zero, and the welfare of domestic residents converges to its minimum 
value.  
 
The first result of the paper is that if the preference of domestic residents for the consumption of the 
public service relative to the consumption of the private good is low enough, the welfare of domestic 
residents will start by decreasing with the number of migrants, then increases, reaches a maximum and 
finally decreases. A corollary of this result is that when the preference for the public service decreases, 
the optimum number of migrants will start from zero and remain at this value. Then it will jump to a 
positive value, and will increase indefinitely. However, the jump is very large, which means that the 
optimum number of migrants is either zero or very large. Moreover, we obtain a positive optimal 
number of migrants only for very low preferences for the public service, and so for an unreasonable 
small  share of the population working in the government sector. Thus, under the assumption that 
migrants and domestic workers are perfect substitute, the model cannot explain the immigration 
policies of OECD and even GCC countries.  
 
If the Government can segregate migrants in specific jobs, where jobs are imperfect substitute for each 
other (but, which requires the same skill), then results turn out to be different. A typical example of 
this is the refusal of medical practitioners to practice in rural areas in Australia. Immigrant doctors are 
happy to go to rural areas. Their visas are issued on the understanding that they practice for a few 
years in the rural areas. Then, migrants displace the domestic residents who held these jobs, and 
considerably expand the number of these jobs. Thus, the wages they pay become much lower. Under 
these circumstances, the optimal number of migrants will take reasonably small positive values, 
provided the size of the sectors of the labour market where they are allowed to work is small. The 
higher proportion of immigrants in the population of GCC countries can be explained by the access of 
these immigrants to a wider range of jobs (so by less segregation) than in industrialised countries.  
 
The paper assumes that for the government, domestic residents and immigrants are different and the 
last group is used only for extracting rent. Migrants do not invest in their host country. So, either they 
will consume their whole income or they will remit part of it to their country of origin. However, 
many migrants become permanent residents and later citizens. They may have planned that when they 
decided to immigrate, or they could have made the decision of permanently settling in the country 
several years after their arrival. The assumptions of this paper do not apply to these cases. The 
definition of an optimal policy of immigration in this situation is also very different from the definition 
we give in this paper. It is an open and important question as to what stage of his “integration” a 
migrant would be considered as a fellow domestic resident by the nationals of the host country. 
 
The model used in this paper is presented in section 1, under the assumption of perfect substitutability 
between the two kinds of labour.  The effects of immigration on the welfare of domestic residents are 
investigated in section 2 at the theoretical level and in section 3 by running a series of simulations. 
Section 4 extends the previous results to the case of the imperfect substitutability of labour. The last 
section concludes. 
 
1. The model 
 
The model assumes an economy, which produces a private consumption good and a public good. The 
production technology of each good uses labour and a specific factor, which is supplied in a fixed 
quantity and normalised to 1. Domestic and foreign workers are perfect substitutes. The economy is 
closed to the rest of the world, except for international immigration and the remittance that immigrants 
may send home. The current output of private and public goods are respectively given by 
b
YALY = , with 10 << b  and 0>A           (1) 
g
GBLG = , with 10 << g  and 0>B                       (2) 
 
where YL  and GL  are the labour inputs used by each sector. There is no technical progress.  
 The quantity of domestic labour is fixed and normalised to 1. M  denotes the number of migrants 
working in the country. The equilibrium of the labour market gives 
MLL GY +=+ 1            (3) 
 
The private good is produced by the private sector, which sets the wage rate w  to the marginal 
productivity of labour. We have 
bb -= 1/ YLAw               (4) 
 
The public good is produced by the government, which owns (or can use freely) the specific factor and 
pays his workers the same wage w  as the private sector. National workers and migrants are paid the 
same wage.  Setting lower wages for migrants would require the introduction of mechanisms that 
justify this difference and would bring little insight to the problems we are investigating.  
 
The public good is made available freely to all by the government and migrants cannot be excluded 
from its consumption. This non exclusion has humanitarian and other reasons. The production cost of 
the public good is equal to the wages paid by the government, GwL . This cost is financed by a lump 
sum tax, which is equally shared between domestic residents and migrants.   
 
The specific factor used by the private sector is entirely owned by domestic residents. Their net 
income is equal to the rent they earn on this factor plus their wages, minus their taxes, 
( ) ( )MwLwwLY GY +-+- 1/ . This income is entirely spent on their consumption of private good 
C . We have 
YwLM
M
YC
+
-=
1
           (5) 
 
The net income of migrants is equal to their wages minus their taxes YG wLM
M
wL
M
M
wM
+
=
+
-
11
. 
It is spent on the purchase of private good, which they consume or transfer to their families at home5.  
 
We assume that the public good is subject to congestion, and that its quantity available  to an individual 
declines as the number of users increases. The simplest way to model the congestion effect is to 
assume that the public good creates a public service S , equally enjoyed by each individual, which is 
equal to the total quantity of the public good divided by a function of the number of users: 
( )jMG +1/ , with 0>j . So public services are rival and non-excludable.  
 
We can deduce from the previous equations the following expression of the supply set of the economy 
( )
( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) 1/1/
11
1 /1/)(/1
/1
/)1(
=++
-+
+ -
-
gggjb
b
bb
b
BSMAC
M
M
          (6) 
 
This expression shows how the trade off between the consumption of private good and of public 
service by the domestic residents, C  and S , depends on the number of migrants M . Domestic 
residents can obtain a zero amount of public service and a consumption of private good 
[ ] ( ) bb -+-+= 11/)1(1 MMAC . This consumption increases with the number of migrants. On the 
other hand domestic residents can obtain a zero amount of private consumption good and a 
consumption of public service ( ) )(1 gj --+= MBS . This consumption decreases with the number of 
migrants if the congestion effect is high enough: gj > . Finally, when we move along the supply set, 
from 0=C  to [ ] ( ) bb -+-+= 11/)1(1 MMAC , the slope of the tangent to this set decreases from 0 
to minus infinity. Figure 1 represents the supply set of the economy for two values of the number of 
migrants. This figure was computed for the calibrated version of the model presented in section 3 (and 
                                                 
5 Migrants have lower income per head than domestic residents because they do not get a share of the rent earned 
by the specific factor used by the private sector. However, they pay the same taxes as domestic residents. We 
made this assumption to simplify the analysis. In a previous version of this paper we explored the case when 
migrants pay no taxes. The results we obtained were qualitatively the same, although the optimal number of 
migrants was lower under this assumption. 
under the assumption gj > ) . We can see how an increase in the number of immigrants expands the 
supply set in the direction of the consumption of private good and contracts it in the direction of the 
consumption of public service. 
 
The utility of domestic residents, u , is a CES function of their consumption of private good and of 
public service.  
( )[ ] ssssss /)1()1/()1/( / +++ += bSCu , with 0>b  if 01 <<- s   
( )[ ] ssssss /)1()1/()1/( +++ += bSCu , with 0³b  if 0>s  
bCSu = , if 0=s  and ( )bSCMinu /,=  if  1-=s      (7) 
 
Along an indifference curve, the substitution rate , dCdS /- , decreases with the value of parameter 
b . Thus, this parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the relative taste of the public service by 
domestic residents. 
 
The government sets the number of migrants and the production of public good, by maximising the 
utility of domestic residents (7) under the resource constraint (6). Thus, we implicitly assume that the 
number of foreign workers who want to enter the country is always greater than the number the 
government wishes to allow in the country. Even when the optimal number of migrants is very high, 
the decrease in wages will be insufficient to discourage workers from foreign countries.  Moreover, we 
give the government strong empowerment and the ability to control the legal situation of any worker 
without cost.  
 
2. The effects of immigration on the welfare of domestic residents  
 
The computation of the effects of immigration is especially easy and revealing when the private 
consumption good and the public service are complementary in the preferences of domestic residents 
that is when 1-=s . Then, the utility function of domestic residents becomes ( )bSCMinu /,=  and 
the Government sets the production of public good G  such that bSCu /== . We also assume in this 
section that the elasticity of output to employment is the same in both sectors: bg = . Then, we 
deduce from the equation of the supply set of the economy the expression of the welfare of domestic 
residents 
( ) b-= Mfu , with  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) bbbjbbbb b /1/)(/1/1/)1( /1)/1(111 BbMAMMMf --- ++-++=        (8) 
 
Migrants have two opposite effects on the welfare of domestic residents. We will have a better 
understanding of the first effect by considering the extreme case where the taste for the public service 
b  is zero. Then the government sets the production of public good and taxes to zero. The utility of 
domestic residents is equal to their consumption of private good, itself equal to their income 
[ ] ( ) bb -+-+== 11/)1(1 MMACu . It is an increasing function in the number of migrants and tends 
to infinity with this number. More precisely we have: ( )MMwMC '/ -=¶¶ .  Thus a small increase 
in the number of migrants decreases the wage of all migrants and increases the income and the 
consumption of domestic residents by the same amount. The effect of a small increase in the number 
of migrants on the utility of domestic residents is zero when there are no migrants present in the 
country; it is maximum when the number of migrants already in the country is )1/(1 b-  (the utility 
function is convex in the number of migrants when )1/(1 b-<M  and concave otherwise).  
 
When the taste for the public service b  is positive, a second effect appears which is that migrants 
create congestion, which reduces the welfare of domestic residents. The following proposition 
describes how under these two effects the optimal number of migrants is determined. It shows how the 
second effect leads to a finite optimal number of migrants, which becomes zero when the taste for the 
public service is high enough  
 
Proposition 1. If the congestion effect is weak that is if bj £  then the optimal number of migrants is 
infinity. If bj > , there exist two thresholds for b : 210 bb << ,  such that when the number of 
migrants increases from zero to infinity, then: a) if the taste for the public service b  is larger than 2b , 
the utility of domestic residents decreases; b)  if the taste for the public service b  is between 1b  and 
2b ,  the utility of domestic residents first decreases, then increases and then decreases. More 
importantly, the optimal number of migrants, which is the number of migrants that maximises the 
utility of domestic residents, is still zero; c) if the taste for the public service b  is smaller than 1b ,  the 
utility of domestic residents still first decreases, then increases and then decreases.  However, the 
optimal number of migrants is positive and equal to the largest of the two roots of the equation in M  
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] 1/1/)1(/1 1111//)1( +- -++-=- bbjb bbjb MMMbAB       (9) 
This number is a decreasing function of b and increases indefinitely when b tends to 0.   
 
Proof.  See the appendix.¦  
 
When the congestion effect is weak, the increase in congestion created by a higher number of migrants 
can be cancelled by affecting a part of these migrants to the production of more public good. The other 
migrants work in the private sector and increase the net income and the consumption of private good 
of domestic residents. Thus, the supply set expands in both directions when the number of migrants 
increases.  
 
When the congestion effect is stronger we are in the configuration of Figure 1 that we commented on 
earlier. We saw that, when there are no migrants in the country, a small inflow of immigrants has no 
effect on the welfare of domestic residents, according to the first effect of immigration. However, the 
second effect, which is the increase of the congestion of the public good, leads to a decrease of this 
welfare. This explains why an inflow of migrants always reduces the welfare of domestic residents 
when the number of migrants already present in the country is low. When there are more migrants in 
the country, the first effect turns positive, which compensates the higher congestion of the public 
service if the taste for this service is low enough. This could explain why, as Boeri and Brücker (2005) 
notice, immigration policy has become less restrictive from 1994 to 2004 in Spain and in Greece 
(these countries had very few migrants in 1994, then the number increased substantially).  
 
If the taste for the public service is low enough, 1bb < , then a decrease in this taste leads to a higher 
optimal number of migrants. The change in the production of public good will result from two 
opposite effects. On one hand, the labour force in the economy is higher, which should imply a higher 
production of both goods. On the other hand the composition of this production changes in favour of 
more private consumption good and less public good. We cannot establish which effect is the 
strongest. The amount of public service delivered to domestic residents, will suffer of a third effect, 
which is that a higher number of immigrants increases the congestion of the public good. 
 
Proposition 1 implies that when the taste for the public service decreases from infinity to zero, then the 
optimal number of migrants will start from zero and remain at this value, then it will jump to a positive 
value and increase indefinitely. The following corollary gives a lower bound for the size of this jump. 
 
Corollary. When the utility function of domestic residents has a local maximum associated to a 
positive number of migrants, the minimum value of this number of migrants,  is the positive root of the 
equation of variable M  
( )
( )[ ]MM
M
b
b
j
-+
+
=
11
21
 (10) 
 This root is a decreasing function of the strength of the congestion effect, j , and tends to zero when 
j  increases indefinitely. 
 
Proof.  We have ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )bb --== 1/1122 /1/' AbBMMfMf . So, M  is the solution of the equation 
MMM
1
)1(1
1
1
1
1
11
=
-+
-
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
++
+
-
b
b
bb
j
. The right side of equation (10) decreases from infinity to 
zero when M  increases from zero to infinity. The expression of the associated value of the preference 
for public services, 2b , can be deduced from equation (9). ¦  
 
Of course the smallest positive optimal number of immigrants, associated to a taste for the public 
service equal to 1b , is largest than this bound.  
 
The results of this section are based on the assumption that the two kinds of consumption are perfect 
complement in the preferences of domestic residents. If we assume instead a Cobb Douglas utility 
function that is a unitary elasticity of substitution between both kinds of consumption, we get the 
following expressions of their optimal values, for a given number of migrants 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]( ) bb b +-+-++= 11111/1 MMbAC  and ( )[ ] ( ) bjb +-++= MbbBS 11/ . So, the utility of 
domestic residents is 
( )
( )
( ) ( )bjb
b
b
b
-+-+
-+
÷
ø
ö
ç
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= b
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M
M
b
b
b
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u 11
11
11
    (11) 
 
If ( )bjb -< /b , u  first decreases, then increases and tends to infinity when M  increases from zero 
to infinity then. In the opposite case, u  decreases and tends to zero. Thus, the optimal number of 
migrants is either infinity (if the preference for the public service is low enough) or zero. 
 
If, instead of the two assumptions made in the beginning of this section we assume that the elasticity 
of substitution between the two kinds of consumption is larger than one ( 0>s ), then, for a given 
level of the number of migrants, a feasible choice by the government is to produce a zero output of 
public good 0== GS . Then the welfare of domestic residents and their consumption of private good 
is [ ] ( ) bb -+-+== 11/)1(1 MMACu . Both increase indefinitely with the number of migrants, 
which establishes that its optimal value is infinity.  
 
We will continue the analysis by simulation methods. 
 
3. Simulations  
 
We set the share of labour in private production  3/2=b  and we assume that bg = . We also set 
604.11=A , 31.7=B . These two values are consistent with the productions 10=Y  and 5.2=G , 
obtained with the respective quantities of labour 8.01 =L  and 2.02 =L . We set the congestion 
parameter 1=j . For these values of parameters we can draw Figure 1, which represents the supply 
set of the economy, given by equation (6), when there are no migrants and when the number of 
migrants is equal to 30% of the population of domestic residents. This figure was commented in 
section 1.  
 
The results of last section suggest that the most favourable case to obtain a reasonable positive value 
for the optimal number of migrants is when both kinds of consumption are perfect complement in the 
preferences of domestic residents. We will make this assumption in the rest of the section. Simulations 
not presented here, run for elasticities of substitution higher than -1, confirm this intuition. However, 
even in this favourable case, we will see that when the optimal number of migrants is positive and 
finite, its value is unreasonable high. Moreover, to obtain nonzero optimal numbers of migrants, we 
must assume a preference for public services extremely low, which implies a extremely small size of 
the government sector in the absence of immigration. 
 
We set the value of the congestion parameter 3=j . Equation (10) shows that this value implies that 
the positive optimal levels of immigration will be more than 0.33. Smaller values for this parameter 
would increase the value of this lower bound, and to obtain a smaller lower bound we would have to 
set this parameter to a still higher value.  
 
Figure 2 represents the utility of domestic residents in function of the number of immigrants, for three 
values of the preferences for the public good, b . If 030.0=b ,  then the utility of domestic residents 
is a decreasing function of the number of migrants. If 028.0=b , this utility first decreases, then 
increases and finally decreases with the number of migrants. However, their optimal number is still 
zero (a local maximum in utility is reached for a number of migrants equal to 0.53 times the 
population of domestic residents ; for a value of b  included between 0.028 and 0.030 this local 
maximum would reach the lower bound 0.33). If 027.0=b , then the utility function has the same 
shape as before, but the optimal number of migrants is positive (equal to 0.60 times the population of 
domestic residents). Other simulations show that if the preference for the public good is above 0.0274 
, then the optimal number of migrants is zero. If this preference is less than 0.0273 the optimal number 
of migrants is more than 58% of the population of domestic residents. A preference for the public 
service as low as 0.0273 implies that, without migrants, less than 1% of the population would work in 
the production of public good. 
 
If we set the congestion effect at the more reasonable value 1=j , equation (10) shows that the 
optimal number of migrants will be either zero or more than ( ) 21/ =- bb  times the population of 
domestic residents. The associated value of the preference parameter for the public service associated 
to this lower bound  is 326.0=b . However, the smallest positive optimal number of migrants is 4.57 
times the population of domestic residents, which is associated to 283.0=b . This value of parameter 
b  is consistent with reasonable values for the allocation of the labour force between the two sectors 
when there are no migrants (77% in the private sector and 23% in the public good sector). But the 
optimal number of migrants is unreasonably high.  
 
We ran a series of simulations for a smaller elasticity of the production of public good to its labour 
input, 3/1=g . We adjusted the value of parameter B  to 4.275, so that without migrants the economy 
was still able to produce the respective amounts 10=Y  and 5.2=G  of goods, with the allocation of 
labour 0.8 and 0.2 between the two sectors. We keep the last value of the congestion effect 1=j . 
Then, we get less dramatic results than in last paragraph. The smaller positive value for the number of 
migrants is equal to 1.14 times the population of domestic residents, and the associated value of the 
preference for the public  good is 111.0=b . However, with this new parameterization, the allocation 
of labour between the two sectors becomes 97.4 and 2.6%, which gives an unreasonably low value to 
the size of the government sector. 
 
These results suggest that the optimal number of migrants in industrialised countries is zero or is 
extremely large. The observed numbers of migrants in GCC countries are of an order of magnitude 
more consistent with the results of the simulations of the model. However, we should assume for these 
countries a strong congestion effect, a strong complementarity between both kinds of consumption in 
the preferences of domestic residents and a low value for the preference for the public service.  The 
validity of these conditions is debatable.  
 
We cannot accept the validity of the conclusion that all migrants who enter OECD countries cause a 
decline in the welfare of their domestic residents. In the next section we will assume that foreign and 
national workers are imperfect substitute, and we will reach less extreme conclusions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
4. Imperfect substitutability between national and foreign labour 
 
4.1. Extension of the model 
 
In this section we will assume that there are two kinds of jobs in the economy, denoted 1 and 2. These 
two jobs differ by their nature, but they ask for the same skill. A domestic  resident can take any of the 
two jobs, but the government can freely allocate immigrants between these jobs. We start by 
considering the private sector, which produces the consumption good. We assume that this sector 
employs YN   domestic residents and YM  immigrants. We have 1YN  domestic residents and 1YM  
immigrants working in jobs of the first kind, while 2YN  domestic residents and 2YM  immigrants have 
taken the second kind of jobs, with 0,,, 2121 ³YYYY MMNN , YYY NNN =+ 21  and 
YYY MMM =+ 21 . The production function of the private sector becomes 
( ) ( )db 2211 YYYY MNMNAY ++=        (12) 
 
with the following conditions on the parameters: 10 <<< bd , 1<+ bd . We assume that there are 
relatively few of the second kinds of jobs, which means that the value of bd /  is small. To simplify 
the exposition we will only consider the case where the number of migrants satisfies the condition 
( ) YY NM db /£     (13) 
 
The two jobs pay the respective wages  
( ) ( )dbb 221111 YYYY MNMNAw ++= -    (14) 
( ) ( ) 122112 -++= dbd YYYY MNMNAw    (15) 
 
We can easily see that the wage rate of domestic residents (and of migrants) working on jobs 1 
increases with the number of immigrants working on jobs 2.  
 
The government allocates migrants between the two jobs so as to maximise the gross income that 
domestic residents obtain from the private sector: 2211 YY MwMwYR --= . The economy is in one 
of the three following regimes 
· 21 ww = , ( )( ) ( ) 1// 1122 =++ YYYY MNMNdb  and 0, 21 ³YY NN 6. 
· 21 ww > , ( )( ) ( ) 1// 1122 >++ YYYY MNMNdb , YY NN =1  and 02 =YN . 
· 21 ww < , ( )( ) ( ) 1// 1122 <++ YYYY MNMNdb , 01 =YN  and YY NN =2 . 
 
In the first regime, the two kinds of jobs pay the same wages, and domestic residents are indifferent 
between them. In the second regime, the second kind of jobs pays lower wages than the first kind, no 
domestic residents take the former jobs, but migrants may be authoritatively allocated to them by the 
government. In the third regime the first kind of jobs pays lower wages and no domestic residents take 
them. We can establish the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. If the number of migrants working in the private sector YM  belongs to the interval 
( ) YYY NMN ybd £</  with 
( )( )( )
bd
bbdbdbd
y
--
-++
=
1
1/1//
2 , then it will be optimal for the 
government to segregate all the immigrants in the second kind of jobs. No domestic residents will take 
these jobs, which pay a lower wage than the jobs of the first kind. If YY NM y> , still no domestic 
residents will work on the second kind of jobs, which pay lower wages, but some migrants might be 
allocated to the first kind of jobs. If ( ) YY NM bd /£ , the economy is in the first regime and the 
allocation of migrants and domestic residents between the two kinds of jobs, which pay the same 
wages, is a matter of indifference.  
 
Proof.  See the appendix.¦  
 
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) note that, for given education and experience attainment the choice of 
occupation of foreign-born residents is quite different from that of natives. They conclude that overall 
                                                 
6  We can easily how that under this regime the production function (12) can be rewritten as 
( )
( ) db
bd
db
bd
db +
+
+
+
= YY MNAY . Formally, we are in the same situation as in the model of section 1. 
immigration over the 1980-2000 period significantly increased the average wages of U.S. born 
workers (by around 2%).  
 
Now, we will complete the model. The production function for the public good is 
( ) ( )db 2211 GGGG MNMNBG ++=       (16) 
 
1GN  and 1GM  respectively denote the number of domestic residents and immigrants working in jobs 
of the first kind, while 2GN  and 2GM  represent the number of domestic residents and immigrants 
having taken the second kind of jobs, with 0,,, 2121 ³GGGG MMNN , GGG NNN =+ 21  and 
GGG MMM =+ 21 . In order to better focus on the problem of the segregation of migrants we limit the 
analysis of the section to the case where the elasticities of production to its two inputs of labour are the 
same in both sectors.  We assume that the Government pays the same wages as the private sector for 
both kinds of jobs, 1w  and 2w . It allocates its manpower between these jobs such as to minimise its 
production cost that is its wage bill. We have 
)(/
)(/
22
11
2
1
GG
GG
MNG
MNG
w
w
+¶¶
+¶¶
=    (17) 
 
The production cost of the public good is covered by a lump sum tax. We make the simplifying 
assumption that the taxes paid by migrants cover the wages cost of migrants working for the 
government. The specific factor used by the private sector is entirely owned by domestic residents. 
Their net income is equal to the rent they earn on this factor plus their wages, minus their taxes (which 
are equal to the wages cost of domestic workers for the government). This income is entirely spent on 
their consumption of private good C . We have 
 CMwMwY YY =-- 2211   (18) 
 
Finally, the equilibrium of the two job markets gives the two last equations 
1=+ GY NN    (19) 
MMM GY =+   (20) 
 
We will solve the model under the assumption that  
( ) YYY NMN ybd £</    (21) 
 
Under this condition, the second kind of jobs pays lower wages and migrants are segregated in these 
jobs and forbidden to take the first kind of jobs. Of course, domestic residents do not accept to work 
on the second kind of jobs.  We deduce from equations (14), (15) and (17) the ratios between the two 
kinds of labour inputs in the two sectors 
MNMNM GGYY == //   (22)       
 
Thus, condition (21) can expressed in the terms of the total number of migrants who have entered the 
economy 
ybd £< M/    (23) 
 
After a succession of eliminations we can express the outputs of the private consumption good and of 
the public good in the terms of the employment of domestic residents by the private sector 
( ) ddbd MANC Y +-= 1  (22) 
ddb MNBG Y
+-= )1(    (23) 
with 10 ££ YN  
 
If we eliminate YN  between these two equations, and if we remember that ( )jMGS += 1/ , 
we get the following expression of the supply set of the economy 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] 1/1)1(/ /1//1 =++- ++++- dbdbjdbdbd d BSMACM  (24) 
 
This expression, as equation (6) in section 1, shows how the trade off between the consumption of 
private good and of public service by domestic residents, C  and S , depends on the number of 
migrants M . Domestic residents can obtain a zero amount of public service and a consumption of 
private good ( ) dd AMC -= 1 . This consumption increases with the number of migrants. On the other 
hand domestic residents can obtain a zero amount of private consumption good and a consumption of 
public service ( ) jd -+= MBMS 1 . This consumption decreases with the number of migrants if we 
introduce the assumption that the congestion effect is high enough: dbj +> . Finally, when we 
move along this set from 0=C  to ( ) dd AMC -= 1 , the slope of the tangent to this set decreases 
from 0 to minus infinity. 
 
4.2. Extension of the results 
 
The computation of the effects of immigration is still especially easy and revealing when the private 
consumption good and the public service are complementary in the preferences of domestic residents 
that is when 1-=s . Then, the Government sets the production of public good G  such that 
bSCu /== . We deduce from the equation of the supply set of the economy the expression of the 
welfare of domestic residents 
( ) ( )db +-= Mgu , with 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]dbdbjdbdbd d ++++- ++-= /1//1/ /1)1(/1 BbMAMMg       (25) 
 
Migrants have two opposite effects on the welfare of domestic residents. In the extreme case where the 
taste for the public service b  is zero, the government sets the production of public good and taxes to 
zero. The utility of domestic residents is equal to their consumption of private good, itself equal to 
their income ( ) dd MACu -== 1 . It is an increasing function in the number of migrants and tends to 
infinity with this number. The reason is that a higher number of migrants drive the wages and the rent 
of domestic residents up. When the taste for the public service b  is positive, a second effect appears 
which is that migrants create congestion, which reduces the welfare of domestic residents. Proposition 
1 has to be revised in the following way. 
 
Proposition 3. If the taste for the public service is included between the two values 3b  and 4b , given 
by 
( ) ( )
( )[ ] bd
jdb
bdj
bdd
+
-+
--
+
=
-
1/
/11
3bB
A
 and 
( ) ( )
( )[ ] bd
jdb
ydj
yd
+
-+
--
+
=
-
11/
11
4bB
A
, then the utility of 
domestic residents reaches a local maximum for a number of migrants included between 
bd /  and y . 
 
Proof. We have ( ) +¥®Mg  when 0®M  and   ( ) +¥®Mg  when +¥®M  if 0>b  and 
( ) 0®Mg  when ¥®M  if 0=b . The derivative of function g  has the same sign as 
( ) ( )MgMg 21 - , with ( ) ( ) ( ) 1/1 1 -++= dbjj MMMg  and 
 ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )dbj
db
d
d
d +
+
++ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
= /
/1
2 11
M
bA
B
Mg  . When M  incrases from 0  to infinity, ( )Mg1  
increases from 0 to infinity and ( )Mg2  increases from ( )
( )
d
d
d
db
+ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
+/1
1bA
B
 to infinity. So, 
when 0=M , we have ( ) ( )MgMg 21 < . But when ¥®M  then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dbjdbj dj ++ > /2/1 ~~ MMgMMg . So, the derivative of function g  has at least one 
positive root.  The derivatives of functions ( )Mg1  and ( )Mg2  are 
( ) ( )( ) úû
ù
ê
ë
é
+
+
+
= M
MM
Mg
Mg
db
j
1
1
' 11  and ( ) ( ) ( ) 1/2 1' -+++
= dj
db
dj
MMg . At their interscetin 
point ( ) ( )MgMg 21 = , we have ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
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Mg . Then, we 
have ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
0
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1
1
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/1
1
21 >ú
û
ù
ê
ë
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-++
+
+
=-
+db
ddb
jd
bA
B
MMM
Mg
MgMg . So, the intersection 
point is unique. 
Now, we will look for the range of variation of parameter b consistent with condition (23). If 
function g  reaches is minimum for bd /=M , then 3bb = .  If the minimum of the function is 
reached for y=M , then 4bb = .¦  
 
4.3. Simulations 
 
We set the share of labour in private production  3/2=+ db  and 025.0=d .  We also set 
909604.12=A , 132.8=B . These two values are consistent with the productions 10=Y  and 
5.2=G  obtained with the quantities of labour 0.8 and 0.2 in the two sectors, and the same wages for 
both jobs. This allocation of production between the two goods is consistent with a preference for the 
public service 25.0=b . We set the congestion parameter 1=j . 
 
Figure 3 represents the utility of domestic residents in function of the number of immigrants M , for 
y££ M0 . We know that for a number of migrants 039.0/ =£ bdM , both jobs pay the same 
wages and we are in a situation similar to the one investigated in previous sections. If  
332.0039.0/ =£<= ybd M , we are in a situation where all migrants are segregated in jobs 2, 
which pay lower wages. We can see that the optimal number of immigrants is 12.7%, which is quite a 
reasonable value.  
 
We obtain a local maximum of utility in the case of total segregation of the immigrants on jobs 2, for 
987.0112.0 43 =££= bbb . The two extreme values of this range are respectively associated to a 
number of migrants equal to y  and to bd / . We computed that the range of values for the 
preferences for the public services, which are consistent with a global maximum of utility is 
409.0112.03 ££= bb .  If 409.0=b , the optimal number of migrants is equal to 6.2% of the 
population of domestic residents. However, this high value of b  implies that without migrants, the 
economy would allocate 34.3% of its manpower to the production of public good. If 409.0>b , the 
optimal number of immigrants is zero. 
 
We²also simulated the model for a positive elasticity of substitution between the two goods in the 
preferences of domestic residents (that is for 01 <<- s . We set the value of parameter b  such that, 
without migrants, the optimal allocation of production between the two goods was still 10=Y  and 
5.2=G  (of course the value of b  has to be changed with the value of s  ). We found that when s  
increases from -1 to 0, the optimal number of migrants only increases from 12.7% to 14.1% of the 
population of domestic residents. 
 
Thus, we see that this new version of the model can explain optimal numbers of migrants of the same 
order of magnitude as what we can see in reality.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper offers a simple explanation of important features of the immigration policies of host 
countries, which are observed in many countries these days. Many countries admit few foreign 
migrants for economic reasons and segregate them in jobs, which domestic workers do not wish to 
undertake. Some other countries admit a much larger number of immigrants and segregate them to a 
wider range of jobs. The paper assumes that domestic residents are all identical. Thus, it eliminates 
considerations based on the specific interest of a class of natives and on economic and political 
conflicts arising in a heterogeneous society.  Moreover, it assumes that although domestic residents 
have no altruistic feelings toward immigrants, they do not bear xenophobic or racist sentiments against 
them. 
 
There exist episodes in the past when such an explanation would have been insufficient. For instance, 
if a large number of foreign migrants were allowed to settle in Western Europe in the fifties and the 
sixties, this was probably to prevent a rise in industrial wages and to allow firms to make enough 
profits to modernise and expand their equipment. This policy strengthened the depressing effects on 
wages induced by domestic migration from the countryside to urban areas. Both movements stopped 
with the wage explosions, which took place in Europe at the end of the sixties. The current debate on 
immigration in the U.S. widely reflects a contradiction between the economic interests of different 
social classes. However, we are convinced that much can be explained on the policy of immigration 
controls by focusing the investigation on the defence of national interest. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. We have ( ) ( ) ( ) 0//10 /1/1 >+= bb BbAf ,  ( ) ¥®Mf  when ¥®M  if 
0>b  and ( ) 0®Mf  when ¥®M  if 0=b . The derivative of function f  is  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]MfMfMMBbMf 211/11/1/1 111/' +--++= ---- bbbb b ,  
with  ( ) ( )( ) bb /11 /1 bABMf -=  and ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )[ ] 1/1/12 1111/ +- -++-= bbj bbj MMMf .  
( )Mf1  is a linear function of M  with a positive slope ( )( ) bb /1/1 bAB- , which decreases with 
parameter b . If bj £ , ( )Mf 2  is negative or zero. Then, the optimal number of migrants is infinity. 
If bj > , ( )Mf 2  is an increasing function of M  with ( ) 01/02 >-= bjf , 
( ) ( )( ) 0/00' 222 >-= bbjff and ( ) ( ) +¥®MfMf ', 22  when +¥®M . ( )Mf 2  is convex for 
M  high enough, may be concave for 0=M , but has at most one inflection point. 
Thus, if parameter b  is low enough, ( )Mf '  has two roots, 1M  and 2M . When the number of 
migrants M  increases from 0 to infinity, ( )Mf  increases from ( )0f  to ( )1Mf , then decreases 
from ( )1Mf  to ( )2Mf , then increases from ( )2Mf  to infinity. When the value of b  increases, 1M  
increases and 2M  decreases. Finally for 2bb =  they converge to a common value minM . Then, when 
the number of migrants M  increases from 0 to infinity, ( )Mf  increases from ( )0f  to infinity, with 
( ) ( ) 0"' minmin == MfMf . For 2bb > , we have ( ) 0' >Mf , which means that when the number of 
migrants M  increases from 0 to infinity, ( )Mf  increases from ( )0f  to infinity.  
We still have to compare the local minimum ( )2Mf  when 2bb < , to ( )0f . We use equation (9) to 
eliminate b  from the expression of ( )Mf . We get 
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-+-++= ----
bj
j
bb bbbb 2
1/1
2
1
2
/1
2 )1(1111 MMMAMf . ( )2' Mf  has the same 
sign as ( ) ( ) 222 1/21/ MM bjbjb ---- . This expression is equal to zero for min2 MM = , as can 
be deduced from equation (10). It is negative for min2 MM > . So, when 2M  increases from minM  to 
infinity, ( )2Mf  decreases from ( )minMf  to zero. We noticed before that ( ) ( )0min fMf > . 1b  is the 
value of parameter b  such that ( ) ( )02 fMf = .¦  
 
Proof of Proposition 2. a) In the third regime we have the condition ( )( ) 1// 12 <+ YYY MMNdb , 
which is equivalent to ( )[ ]( )YYY MNM ++> dbb /1 . As 1YY MM ³  we obtain for the existence of 
this regime the condition ( ) YY NM db /> . This condition is not satisfied. 
b) In the second regime the wages paid by the two jobs are ( ) dbb 2111 YYY MMNAw -+=  and 
( ) 1212 -+= dbd YYY MMNAw .  We also have the condition ( ) ( ) 1// 12 >+ YYY MNMdb  , which is 
equivalent to  ( )[ ]( )YYY MNM ++> dbd /2 . As 2YY MM ³  we obtain the condition 
( ) YY NM bd /> . 
The production function of the private sector is ( ) db 21 YYY MMNAY += . The income of domestic 
residents created by the activity of this sector is 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]2212 11 YYYYYYY MMNMMMNAR ---+--+= - bdddb . 
The government sets the number of migrants working on jobs 2, 2YM , under the constraint 
YY MM ££ 20 , so as to maximise function R .  The derivative of this function is 
( ) ( )[ ] 2222 1/1
111
YYYYYYYY MMNMMMNdM
dR
R -+---
-+
-+
-
=
bdd
db
.  It has the same sign 
as ( ) ú
û
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é
+
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-
++úû
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+
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d
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1
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2 2
2
2 . 
The minimum of this function of 2YM  is reached for úû
ù
êë
é ++
+
= YYYY MMNM d
b
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d 2/
2 .  Then, 
the value of the function is ( ) ÷÷
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++÷
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+
- YYYYYY MNMNMN bd
d
d
bd
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. This 
function of YM  is non negative, that is 
( )
0
4
1 22 ³++
--
- YYYY NMNMd
bdb
, if  
( )( )
bd
bbdbdbd
y
--
-++
=£
1
1/1//
2 YYY NNM . Then YY MM =2  .  
If YY NM y> , then 2YM  is equal to the smallest root of 2/ YdMdR , 2ˆ YM , if ( ) ( )YY MRMR >2ˆ . 
Otherwise, we have YY MM =2 . We have  
( )
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= 222 4
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YYYYYYY NMNMMNM d
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. We easily 
deduce from the condition YY NM y>  and from the expression of y  that YY MM <2ˆ . 
c) In regime 1 we have ( ) ( ) 22 / YYYY NMNM -++= bdd . So, we can give 2YM  any arbitrary 
value in the interval ÷÷
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bd
db
bd YY
YY
YY MNMinMM
NM
Max ,0,0 2 , and the previous 
equation gives the value of 2YN .  
Then, if YY NM )/( bd> , we can set  2YM  to its upper bound ( )[ ]( )YY MN ++ dbd / , which 
is the lower bound of regime 2. So, we can see that this regime dominates regime 1. If 
YY NM )/( bd< , then we can give 2YM  any arbitrary value included between 0 and YM .¦  
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